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ABSTRACT
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an increasingly significant element of today’s global
economy. Since the 1980s, global FDI flows have experienced impressive increments up until
2007. FDI flows decreased significantly during the years following the global financial crisis of
2008 and have not yet returned to pre-crisis levels. Since the 2008 global financial crisis,
significant changes have occurred in the regulatory and international investment environments
while complexity of national tax systems had steadily increased during the past century. This
study analyzes the effect of national tax complexity on FDI before and after the 2008 global
financial crisis. The Heckman selection model is used to analyze tax complexity effects over the
existence of bilateral FDI relationships. The gravity model of trade is used to analyze factors
determining bilateral FDI flows between a pair of source and host countries. This study provides
new evidence about the relationship between tax complexity and bilateral FDI flows before and
after the global financial crisis of 2008. Empirical results from this research show a negative
relationship between complexity levels of national tax systems and levels of FDI flows
developed after the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, this research shows a negative relation
between national tax complexity and the existence of bilateral FDI flows continued after the
2008 financial crisis. These findings have important implications for national policy makers,
regulators, investors, and executives from Multinational Corporations.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important element of today’s global economy. It
started playing an increasingly significant role during the 1980s. Since then, global FDI flows
have experienced impressive increments, rising about seven times (in current U.S. dollars)
during the 1990s (Razin & Sadka, 2012). FDI has a strong impact to the economic growth of the
host country. The main benefits for the country receiving FDI have been documented to be new
capital infusion, improved technology, and the transfer of managerial technical knowledge
(Asheghian, 2004). These benefits often result in the creation of new jobs and improved
infrastructure. Additionally, evidence from academic research alludes to a positive relation
between FDI inflows and national literacy rates (Suliman & Mollick, 2009). Since the 1980s, due
to the many tangible benefits related to FDI, many countries have been engaged in an
international competition that consists in lowering corporate income tax rates to attract FDI. This
competition helped to drive global FDI flows to reach a peak of about $2.1 trillion in 2007.
Subsequently, following the 2008 financial crisis, global FDI flows dropped to about $1trillion
dollars in 2009. Stoddard and Noy (2015) explain that financial crises have had a negative
impact on FDI flows into developing and emerging countries. The 2008 financial crisis affected
many aspects of the global economy impacting almost every country of the world. Global FDI
flows fell by 21% in 2008 as consumers’ confidence plummeted and worldwide output and tax
revenues declined (Poulsen & Hufbauer, 2011).
The financial crisis of 2008 was the worst the world economy has experienced in over 60
years (Alfaro & Chen, 2010). Evidence from academic research suggests that tax complexity
1

contributed to some of the determinants that lead to the crisis. Shaviro, (2011) concluded that
one of the triggers of the 2008 financial crisis was the tax complexity of derivatives and noted
that complexity levels of national tax systems, combined with complex financial transactions on
the parts of multinational corporations (MNCs), may have contributed to the crisis. Keen, et al.
(2010) noted that distortions caused by high complexity levels of national tax systems made the
crisis’ effects even more painful. It has been established that national tax complexity has a
negative impact to a country’s economy. Davis (2017) stated that keeping regulatory and a
national tax systems as simple as possible leads to a more vibrant economy while Tran-Nam and
Evans (2014) noted that the combined effects of a highly complex national tax system may result
in slower economic output and can undermine trust in its fairness. Academic research has
demonstrated a negative relationship between the existence of FDI flows and tax complexity.
Lawless (2013), for example, empirically examined the effect of tax complexity on FDI flows
after accounting for the inverse relationship between tax complexity and the existence of
bilateral FDI flows between a pair of source and host countries. She found that tax complexity
had no significant effect on FDI flows once the factors driving a bilateral FDI relationship have
been accounted for. She also estimated that a 10% reduction in tax complexity would increase
FDI inflows by 6%, using data from the period prior to the 2008 financial crisis.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, significant changes have occurred in the regulatory and
international investment environments. Historically, member countries of The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had been the main source of global FDI
flows. Although this trend has continued during the post-crisis period, China emerged as an
important exporter of FDI flows during the years following the 2008 financial crisis. According
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to the international investment report published by the OECD 1 in 2007, China had increased its
FDI outflows by a factor of 19 compared to those reported in the year 2000. Although, in 2007
China was still not considered a main source of global FDI flows, it became an increasingly
important source of global FDI flows soon after the financial crisis. According to data from the
United Nations’ (UN) World Investment Report 2, by 2010 China was the fifth largest source of
global FDI flows and by 2016 stood behind the United States as the second largest source of FDI
flows 3. Meanwhile, the largest European economies experienced significant decreases in their
respective FDI outflows during the post-crisis period. Between 2007 and 2016, Germany and
France reported 58% and 41% respective FDI outflows decreases. Meanwhile the UK, the
second largest source of global FDI flows in 2007, reported negative FDI outflows for the third
year in a row in 2016. The incursion of China as an important influencer in the post 2008
financial crisis global investment environment, combined with a diminished role of large
European economies, signify an important development in the world economy that could signal a
shift in the landscape of the determinants of global FDI flows.
Keen et al. (2010) explained that during the years preceding the 2008 financial crisis,
high complexity levels of national tax codes encouraged MNCs to execute aggressive tax
planning strategies and use complicated financial instruments with the main goal of minimizing
tax payments. They argued that low tax rates combined with tax codes “biased towards favoring
debt finance” motivated preference for high risk investments and the accumulation of excessive

1

OECD Investment Newsletter Issue 6, March, 2008. http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/investmentnews.htm
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UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011 https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2011_en.pdf

UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017
https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1782
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debt. They also noted that these practices created tax distortions related to the future performance
of MNC’s foreign investments. They concluded that these tax distortions made the effects of the
2008 financial crisis more painful and, if left unchanged, will made these companies more
vulnerable to future financial crises. Given the extensive scope of the economic impact of the
2008 global financial crisis, it is reasonable to expect for international investors to implement
internal policies aimed to continually monitor and assess foreign investments while becoming
more careful when deciding for new investments. Policy makers from many countries around the
world were also compelled to implement fiscal reforms to promote growth. In its annual
publication ‘Going for Growth’ edition of 2012, the OECD noted that many member countries
were considering implementing “growth-friendly tax reforms” intended to reduce obstacles for
investment. LeBlanc et al (2013) noted that governments from OECD member countries were
under pressure to implement tax reforms to reduce national corporate income tax rates to attract
FDI flows.
Various studies revealed changes to tax systems after the 2008 financial crisis.
Nevertheless, what has not been addressed was whether changes in tax complexity have had an
impact on FDI flows after the 2008 financial crisis. Data from UN World Investment Report
show a modest recovery of global FDI flows seven years after the 2008 financial crisis.
However, global FDI flows experienced a downward trend after 2015 that continued until today
and ten years after the crisis, global FDI flows have regressed back to the $1 trillion, a volume in
global FDI not seen since 2009. This study will analyze the impact of tax complexity on FDI
flows following the 2008 financial crisis and compare it to that from the pre-crisis period.

4

The Problem Statement
Data gathered from the UN World Investment Report 4 validate that the level of FDI
flows after the 2008 financial crisis is lower than what the world economy experienced during
the years prior to the financial crisis. In 2009, the global FDI flows decreased by 49% from its
all-time record levels experienced in 2007. There has not been a steady growth of FDI flows
from 2009 to date. As previously noted, the OECD discussed in various publications the pressure
on national legislators to enact tax reforms intended to attract FDI flows, following the 2008
financial crisis. However, many of these policymakers’ countries seek to lower tax rates while
protecting tax bases from aggressive tax planning strategies (LeBlanc et al 2013). As such, many
tax reforms enacted after the 2008 financial crisis have focused on preventing tax evasion and
increasing enforcement (Slemrod, 2016). Questions remain whether these reforms will increase
tax complexity or simplify the tax system. Moreover, the implications thereof for FDI flows also
remain unknown. This study will shed light on the effect of tax complexity over FDI flows by
providing an analysis of the relationship between bilateral FDI flows and host country tax
complexity in the periods preceding and following the global financial crisis of 2008. It can be
expected that reductions to statutory tax rates combined with decreases to the complexity levels
of a national tax system would encourage increases to FDI flows.
Overview: Problem Background
During the years following the 2008 global financial crisis, global FDI flows have not
experienced the consistent increases in volume, as those enjoyed during the years prior to the

4

UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017
https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1782
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crisis. Figure 1 presents the total global FDI flows based on the UN World Investment Report 5,
over the period that starts nine years before the 2008 financial crisis and ends nine years after the
crisis. Global FDI flows experienced over 100% increment in volume during the nine years
between 1999 and 2007. According to the OECD 6, global FDI flows experienced strong
increments driven by high equity values and a rise in utilities privatization, combined with
optimistic expectations from investors. By the year 2000, global FDI flows reached $1.2 trillion,
a historic record at the time, representing an increase of over 500% from levels reached just five
years earlier. However, in 2001 global FDI flows declined 56%, driven by a sharp decline in the
price of equities mainly due to “the burst of the dot.com investment bubble” and a significant
decrease in cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). Persistent macroeconomic
weakness from developed economies combined with geopolitical uncertainties allowed for a
downward trend in global FDI flows that continued until the year 2003, when global FDI flows
were reported at $529 Million. Signs of a positive turnaround became apparent during the second
half of 2003. 7Improved macroeconomic performance from several developed economies, strong
corporate profits, low interest rates and a recovery in equity prices fueled an upward trend in
global FDI flows that started in 2004 and lasted until 2007, when global FDI flows were reported
at $2.1 trillion, an all-time record that still stands today. During the years immediately following
the financial crisis, 2009 experienced the highest percentage decline in global FDI flows,

5

UNCTAD World Investment Reports from 2000 thru 2017
https://unctad.org/en/pages/home.aspx
6

OECD International Investment Perspectives, September 2002.
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/1938165.pdf
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Discussion in this section is based on OECD Investment newsletters published between May 2006 and October
2012 and OECD publications ‘FDI In Figures’ issued between April 2013 and April 2018.
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/investmentnews.htm
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declining 35% from 2008 levels and 49% from the record setting levels reached in 2007. Global
FDI flows showed signs of recovery by increasing 25% in 2010 and 14% in 2011. The growth
was driven by an increase in international M&As activity despite the debt crisis in Europe and
weak economic indicators from the United States. Although, most of the investment activity
during this period originated from North America and Western Europe, by 2011 China was the
fourth largest source of international M&As. Global FDI flows decreased 18% during 2012 and
experienced a period of stagnation from 2012 until 2014. Corporate restructuring by US
companies helped to drive an increase of 29% in FDI flows during 2015. However, those crossborder restructurings were executed with the purpose of reducing tax obligations and did not
represent new fruitful investments. A sharp decline in corporate restructurings likely driven by
decreased incentives caused by tax reforms, combined with uncertainty related to the 2017 tax
reform in the United States were the main causes for a downward trend in FDI flows that started
in 2016. By the end of 2018, global FDI flows have plunged to about $1Trillion. How did
complexity levels of national tax systems influence global FDI flows before and after the
financial crisis of 2008? Could the effect of tax complexity over FDI flows have intensified after
the 2008 financial crisis?
Hemmelgarn and Nicodème, (2010) described the 2008 financial crisis as the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression and explain that policymakers acted to offer
regulatory changes, including tax reforms as a response to the crisis. The general initial reaction
to the financial crisis, within developed economies, have been towards an increase in regulation
(Véron, 2012).
As noted by Lawless (2013), there is limited academic research dedicated to studying the
potential effects of tax complexity on FDI flows. The World Bank Doing Business survey
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provides a series of proxies to measure national tax complexity levels. The methodology to
measure tax complexity as published by the World bank was developed by Djankov et al. (2010)
and is described in better details in the data section of this study. The two main indicators that
measure national tax complexities are identified as, a) the number of taxes paid within a year that
are needed to comply with national tax requirements, and b) the time, measured in hours, needed
to prepare and pay taxes within a given country. These two proxies for tax complexity as
published by the World Bank Doing Business are available from 2005 forward. Figure 2 shows
the world average number of taxes, as a measure of tax complexity; Figure 3 shows the world
average of the time required to prepare and pay taxes, measured in hours. Both graphs depict
data from 2005 thru 2017.
The world average number of tax payments has been decreasing every year since 2005,
when it was reported as slightly over 34 payments per year. However, annual decreases
accelerated following 2008 financial crisis. Total number of payments decreased 7.14% from
2005 to 2008. But decreased 13.33% from 2008 to 2012. From 2005 to 2017, the world average
of annual number of tax payments have decreased 30.42%. This decrease could be a direct
consequence of a general globalized effort to simplify national tax systems as a manner to attract
new foreign investments and may have been accelerated by authorities’ response to the crisis.
The time, measured in hours, necessary to prepare and pay taxes have been decreasing
annually since 2005, when it was reported as 302 hours. The only exception was 2013, when the
total time to prepare and pay taxes increased 5.41%. Total number of hours decreased 8.47%
from 2005 to 2008 and it decreased 10.20% from 2008 to 2012. From 2005 to 2017, the world
average of annual number of hours to prepare and pay taxes have decreased 20.74%. This
decrease could also be the result of a general globalized effort to simplify national tax systems.
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However, this reduction could also be a direct consequence of improved and more efficient
technologies.
Overall, tax complexity as measured by the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey, has
been declining since 2005. However, these annual reductions in national tax complexity
accelerated in the years following the financial crisis of 2008. Therefore, this study will
investigate the impact of tax complexity on bilateral FDI flows with particular emphasis on
providing a comparison of the strength of the relationship before and after the 2008 global
financial crisis.
Purpose of the Study
This study intends to fill the gap in the literature by assessing the impact of tax
complexity on bilateral FDI flows before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. No
academic literature has analyzed the effects of tax complexity over bilateral FDI flows after the
2008 financial crisis. The analysis will employ the empirical methodology of a gravity model as
used by Lawless (2013) and involving twelve variables (FDI, Time to Comply, Number of
Payments, Statutory Tax Rate, Relative Time to Comply, Relative Number of Payments, GDP
per Capita, Population, Language, Schooling Difference, Host in OECD, and Non High Income
Country) that are described in detail in section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3.
Practical Contribution
FDI flows contribute to the growth of the world economy. Evidence from Borja (2017)
suggests that increases in FDI flows indeed improve national economic activity.
Understanding the connection between tax complexity and investment decisions is
important because changes in tax law typically alter the complexity of the tax system, and taxes
impact the outcome of many types of investment decisions made in market settings (Boylan &
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Frischmann, 2006). This study aims at providing an answer to this question and thereby
informing regulators about a direction for tax reforms and improvements to national fiscal
policies that could incentivize FDI inflows. In addition, a comparison to the pre-crisis period can
further inform governments about the effectiveness of specific tax complexity-related policies.
There have been various studies analyzing the potential effects of tax complexity over
FDIs. Lawless (2013) studied the potential impact of tax complexity related to bilateral FDI
flows relationship. This study adds to the literature by revisiting this important issue and
providing a comparison between the pre and post-crisis periods.
Definitions
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI): According to the European Union Statistics Office
FDI is an international investment within the balance of payment accounts. Essentially, an
investor who is considered a resident in a specific country acquires a lasting interest in an
economic entity residing in a different country. A lasting interest implies the existence of a longterm relationship and have been defined as owning 10 percent or more of the voting stock,
Djankov et al. (2010). Simões et al. (2015) summarizes the definition of FDI as “an investment
made to acquire lasting interest in firms operating outside the investor’s home economy”. This
information is available in USD and as a percentage of GDP. FDI data is published annually by
various international organizations like, the United Nations, The World Bank and The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Bilateral FDI: Foreign Direct Investment flows between two countries. The components
of Bilateral FDI flows, by its own definition, are investment flows going from a source country
into a host country combined with investment flows going from the host country into the source
country. FDI flows from a source country into a host country are known as ‘Outward FDI’ or
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‘FDI Outflows.’ Additionally, FDI flows coming into a source country from a host country are
known as ‘Inward FDI’ or ‘FDI Inflows.’
FDI Outflows (also known as Outward FDI): These represent the sum of transactions that
increase lasting interest investments in enterprises resident in a foreign economy, less any
transactions that decrease said investments. Typically, transactions that increase lasting interest
investments are defined as the purchase of equity or the reinvestment of earnings. Transactions
that decrease lasting interest investments are defined as the sale of equity or by borrowings
received by the investor from the enterprise. These transactions can be positive or negative,
during any given period.
FDI Inflows (also known as Inward FDI): These represent the sum of transactions that
increase lasting interest investments that a foreign investor (i.e. resident in a host country)
acquires in enterprises resident in a local economy (i.e. source country), less any transactions that
decrease said investments. Typically, transactions that increase lasting interest investments are
defined as the purchase of equity or the reinvestment of earnings. Transactions that decrease
lasting interest investments are defined as the sale of equity or by borrowings received by the
investor from the enterprise. These transactions can be positive or negative, during any given
period.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): An international
organization founded in 1961 and currently headquartered in Paris, France, which is comprised
of 36 member countries. The OECD provides a forum for in which governments can work
together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems. It sponsors studies to
understand what drives economic, social, and environmental change. It compiles data to measure
productivity and global flows of trade and investment. (http://www.oecd.org)
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National Tax Complexity: The concept of tax complexity is a subjective concept very
difficult to isolate and it is often objectively defined. Existing academic research has opted to
study tax complexity by measuring it. The most accepted method to measure tax complexity as
identified in existing academic research, the World Bank and the OECD, are the numbers of
hours that an average firm will have to invest in order to comply with local tax rules, combined
with the number of payments within a year, that it will need to make in order to achieve
compliance with the national tax system. The more hours and number of payments, the more
complex the tax system is deemed to be.
Collected Annual Tax Revenues: The amount of cash received by a government from
direct and indirect taxes levied on companies or individuals, within a year. This data is available
in national currency and/or as a percentage of GDP.
The World Bank: An international financial institution founded in 1944 and currently
headquartered in Washington D.C. and counts with 189 member countries. The World Bank has
two main goals as its mission: to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity in a
sustainable way. It intends to achieve these goals by working in every major area of development
and provide an open databank available to the general public with a vast set of information
related to a very wide scope of indicators. The dataset that is of the most interest for the purposes
of this study is the World Development Indicators. (https://www.worldbank.org)
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
Evidence from academic research suggests a significant positive relation between FDI
flows and countries’ economic growth (Asheghian, 2004; Naawaab & Diarrassouba, 2016;
Borja, 2017). The importance of FDI flows to the global economy continues to be of high
significance after the financial crisis. However, it can be reasonably argued that the condition of
the world economy and its underlying drivers may have shifted after the external shock
represented by the global financial crisis of 2008. Stoddard and Noy (2015) noted that in 2010,
developing and transition economies received more than 50% of the total global FDI inflows and
based on data from the OECD, FDI flows from emerging economies are becoming increasingly
important in the world economy. Thus, MNCs from emerging economies appear to have become
more important contributors to global FDI flows. During the same period, the political
environment in many countries has also experienced significant changes. Additionally, many
countries who were already highly indebted, implemented restrictive fiscal policies while others
committed to substantial deficit spending during the immediate years after the crisis, Armingeon
(2012). Additionally, tax enforcement agencies, in most OECD member countries, have become
more aggressive in their efforts to minimize tax avoidance and tax evasion (LeBlanc et al, 2013;
Slemrod, 2016). In June of 2012, the G20 leaders announced their intention to work together
with the OECD to prevent ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ (BEPS). Tax avoidance is closely
linked to the BEPS practice, where via a series of tax planning strategies, MNCs shift their
taxable revenues to lower tax jurisdictions. In July of 2013, the OECD issued a 15 points action
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items that would provide a clear path for multilateral cooperation among nations with regards to
international taxation, (Dharmapala, 2014). These new trends seem to have encouraged, in some
countries, important changes to their respective national tax systems. At the same time, these
real-world trends might be impacting global FDI decisions and subsequent FDI flows.
Theoretical Foundation
The study uses the well-established empirical framework of the gravity model to estimate
the relationship between tax complexity and FDI flows as in Lawless (2013), Edminston et al.
(2003) and Muller and Voget (2012). The theoretical framework of the international tax
competition is used herein to develop hypotheses about the potential impact of tax complexity on
FDI flows.
International tax competition theory posits that governments compete in attracting capital
investments by lowering corporate tax rates. In this context, it is important to highlight that
besides taxes, multinational corporations often consider several other factors, such as political
stability, geographic location, national infrastructure, and availability of skilled labor, to name a
few. However, national statutory corporate income tax rates are an important factor when
deciding for an investment location, because it has a direct impact to the future return on the
investment can be relatively easy to determine, (LeBlanc et al., 2013). For this reason, and in
their goal to attract new foreign capital investment or FDI, countries have been engaging, during
recent decades, in a tax competition that targets lower national corporate income tax rates as an
effective way to attract new FDI.
International tax competition theory also suggests that a country accepts the risk of
lowering tax revenues in exchange for greater future benefits expected from new FDI inflows.
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As of 2018, data from the Tax Foundation 8 shows that the unweighted average worldwide
statutory tax rate has declined over 37% from 1980, when it was about 39%. In 2018, this
worldwide average was 24.5%. Djankov et al. (2010) researched the effects of corporate tax rates
on investment and entrepreneurship thereby forming a new database of income tax rates for 85
countries in 2004. They concluded that the effective corporate tax rates have a negative
relationship with the rate of investments. This aligns with previous research papers and supports
the international tax competition theory (Slemrod, 1990; Hasset & Hubbard, 1996; Deveraux et
al., 2002; Hines, 2007). It can also help to explain the global trend of decreasing corporate tax
rates during the past few decades. Lawless (2013), predicted that a decrease in tax complexity
will be comparable to a decrease in the effective corporate tax rates at a 10%-to-1% ratio.
In addition to many countries implementing significant reforms to their respective
financial and fiscal systems, the international tax competition continued during and after the
2008 global financial crisis.
Tax Complexity
Based on the recent review of available academic research on this subject, it seems
evident that providing a simple definition for tax complexity proved to be a challenging task and
a better approach would be to research its determinants and potential effects. A universal
definition for tax complexity has proven elusively difficult for academic scholars to achieve. But
understanding tax complexity could be very important due to its influence on existing problems
across many industries. Therefore, the best approach to study the effects of tax complexity seems

8

Data taken from K. Jahnsen and K. Pomerleau (2017). Corporate Income Tax Rates Around the World, published
in The Tax Foundation’s website.
https://taxfoundation.org/corporate-income-tax-rates-around-the-world-2017/
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to be by measuring complexity levels according to accepted units of measure as identified in
existing academic literature.
All of the literature reviewed for this study did not provide a simple definition for tax
complexity. Tran-Nam and Evans (2014), identified the subjective nature of the concept of
‘complexity’ as a cause for the difficulty in defining tax complexity. In their paper, they
explained that the notion of complexity is perceived as a “multidimensional concept that can’t be
easily defined or uniquely measured.” They also emphasized that different individuals could
perceive tax complexity differently. This is the fundamental reason that tax complexity could be
more easily perceived and understood when it is expressed in reliable units of measure. Heyndel
and Smolders (1995) determined that tax complexity could be measured based on the tax
system’s fragmentation and the visibility of the tax revenue collected as they relate to the
taxpayer. Warskett et al. (1998) mentions that tax complexity “is usually associated with the
numbers of tax rates, tax bases and special provisions it includes”.
The World Bank’s Doing Business survey provides a measurement of tax complexity
based on the number of annual tax payments combined with the total number of hours needed for
a standardized firm to comply with a specific country’s tax obligations, as developed by Djankov
et al. (2010). The higher the indicator, the higher the complexity level of a national tax system.
This indicator of the level of tax complexity within a country, seems to be well ratified as an
accepted indicator of measuring tax complexity in recent research papers.
This literature review also provided an insight of the different determinants for the
increased complexity levels of tax systems. Evidence suggests that the determinants of tax
complexity contribute to its multidimensional nature. Additionally, such determinants have their
origins within respective national legislatures and are based on the political system of a related

16

country. As such, it could be expected that national tax complexity levels be related to the
aggressiveness levels of a country’s regulatory environment. However, more research will be
necessary to confirm this kind of relationship. According to Warskett et al. (1998), “In order to
economize on the costs of tax administration, any government in a democratic state must
implement a tax structure in which heterogeneous taxpayers are grouped for the purpose of
taxation”. They argue that, within a democratic government, politicians are motivated to increase
complexity of the national tax system to accommodate taxpayers’ demands and expectations.
Interestingly, while tax complexity is described as necessary to please taxpayers, it is also
identified as indicative of inefficient public administration, (Warskett et al., 1998). This agrees
with Kaplow (1995) who attributed tax complexity to deficient legislation that sometimes deviate
from tax principles to subsidize certain activities and taxpayer groups. It is evident that the
origins of most of tax complexity can be found within the control of a country’s political system
and appears motivated, at least in some instances, by political interests.
For democratic governments, political interests play an important role in increasing
complexity of a tax system, as it is difficult for politicians to risk their political careers by
ignoring the demands of different sectors of the population. Additionally, the globalization of the
economy and the inherent complexities of modern societies are also valid promoters of increased
complexity within any given national tax system. Governments often find themselves in need to
review tax laws and regulations to ensure national tax rules are perceived as fair, while ensuring
that all necessary tax revenues are properly and promptly collected. According to Kaplow (1995)
“The very use of an income tax (or personal consumption tax) rather than a sales tax or a head
tax involves the use of a substantial and complex set of rules imposing significant compliance
costs on taxpayers and administrators for the purpose of assessing each taxpayer’s circumstances
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more accurately in terms of some notion of their equitable tax burden.” Additionally, Krause
(2000) argued that complexity arises from the need of implementing a tax system that can be
perceived as fair in the way it levies taxes on the population.
Evidence from research articles seem to also suggest that certain determinants of tax
complexity can be outside of a governments’ control. Tran-Nam and Evans (2014) stated that
legislators cannot directly control many sources of complexity. Taxpayers may prefer more
complexity to lower their tax liabilities while tax practitioners may prefer a certain degree of
complexity to generate chargeable hours. The engagement in aggressive tax planning by a
partnership between high-risk tax practitioners and high-risk taxpayers gives rise to effective
complexity (Tran-Nam & Evans, 2014).
It has also been determined that national tax systems play a key role in attracting FDI and
influencing the direction of future economic growth of a country. Additionally, it is well
documented that aggressive tax planning can lead to tax avoidance, which is negatively related to
collected tax revenues. Tax avoidance have become a persistent problem in recent decades and it
is often cited as a catalyst for national legislatures to become more aggressive in their
enforcement efforts and prompt to enact stricter rules to discourage engaging in aggressive tax
planning, making it more difficult and riskier. Although, it can be argued that some degree of
complexity in the tax code is necessary to discourage tax avoidance (Tran-Nam & Evans, 2014),
it cannot always ensure compliance and might become fertile ground for aggressive tax planning.
Lawless (2013) noted that a simpler tax system will make rather difficult to engage in tax
avoidance or tax evasion. That conclusion concurred with Milliron (1985) whose findings
provide evidence that increasing the complexity of a tax system does not guarantee that it will
necessarily achieve its intended goals. Additionally, evidence suggests that a highly complex tax
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system can itself become an obstacle to ensure an efficient or effective enforcement of the laws
and regulations found within such tax system. Krause (2000), determined that a complex tax
system can undermine the effectiveness of its policies and become costly. This seems to agree
with evidence from Tran-Nam and Evans (2014) article that suggests “tax complexity causes
deadweight losses as the operating costs of the tax system represent a social wastage similar to
efficiency costs of taxation”. This is significant because evidence from recent research suggests
that one of the effects of tax complexity is an unplanned increment in government’s operational
costs and inefficiencies. However, as previously discussed, evidence from Warskett et al. (1998)
suggests that inefficiencies in public administration is a precursor of complex tax systems. It is
then possible to argue that an inefficient political system could be the main cause of increments
in the complexity of tax systems. But at the same time, complex systems seem to contribute to
inefficiencies in public administration, which in turn promotes increments in systems’
complexity. This last statement implies the existence of a cycle between inefficient public
administration and complex tax systems, which could be continuously ‘feeding each other’ for
extended periods of time. More research will be needed regarding a potential relationship
between tax complexity and efficiency levels of public administrations and their potential
effects, if any, on the evolution of political systems. Having an unexpected increment in
operational government costs will increase pressure for the government to cover for those costs
via reducing other social programs, or an increment of national debt or by increasing tax
revenues. In times of healthy economic growth, these pressures can be managed, but in times of
economic difficulties, this could become a catalyst for increased enforcement efforts via tax
audits and/or reviews. It can be expected that the 2008 global financial crisis highlighted the
need to enact tax reforms directed to promote economic growth and to attract FDI flows. Over
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half of the 34 OECD member countries decreased their statutory corporate income tax rates
during the years following the crisis, LeBlanc et al. (2013). At the same time, countries with
already highly complex tax systems might have seen the need to simplify their tax systems while
increasing aggressiveness in enforcing the tax code. More research will be needed to better
understand the relationship between national tax complexity and an increase of the
aggressiveness in the enforcement efforts from national tax regulators.
In the United States, the National Taxpayer Advocate's Annual Report to Congress
(2012) reported that complexity is the main issue faced by taxpayers and the IRS. Marcus (2013)
research article confirmed that tax complexity also increases compliance burden on taxpayers.
Heydel and Smolders (1995) suggested that tax complexity also increases informational costs for
the taxpayer, because the more complex the tax system is, the more time and resources will the
taxpayer need to invest in order to understand it. This is in agreement with Edmiston et al. (2003)
article, which stated that “tax complexity is costly because firms must seek to understand the tax
law as it applies to their activities and to fulfill the requirements necessary for them to remain in
compliance.” Based on existing evidence, tax complexity increases costs for the government as
well as compliance costs for taxpayers. In the case of MNCs, the cost incurred to manage the
complexity of a national tax system could be significant. High costs associated with new
investment decisions could delay the investment or become a significant reason not to invest.
Lawless (2013) proved a negative relation between tax complexity and the existence of an FDI
relationship between countries. At the same time, Keen et al. (2010) noted that once an MNC has
invested in a new market, costs related to compliance in a highly complex tax system could
result in lower returns than previously expected. This distinction is important as it could have a
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direct effect on the level of FDI flows between two countries, and it could also become a
motivator to consider discontinuing an existing FDI bilateral relationship.
Foreign Direct Investments
The concept of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can be defined “as investment made by
one firm from a host country to acquire lasting interest in firms operating outside the investor’s
home economy” Simões et al. (2015). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) defines FDI as “a cross-border investment made by a resident in one
economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise
(the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct
investor. The motivation of the direct investor is a strategic long-term relationship with the direct
investment enterprise to ensure a significant degree of influence by the direct investor in the
management of the direct investment enterprise. The ‘lasting interest’ is evidenced when the
direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the direct investment enterprise.” The
European Union Statistics Office defines FDI as “the category of international investment that
reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by an investor in one economy in an
enterprise resident in another economy. The lasting interest implies that a long-term relationship
exists between the investor and the enterprise, and that the investor has a significant influence on
the way the enterprise is managed. Such an interest is formally deemed to exist when a direct
investor owns 10% or more of the voting power on the board of directors (for an incorporated
enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise).”
FDI flows have become attractively important for all countries, regardless of the status of
their respective economies. However, Naawaab and Diarrassouba (2016) noted that FDI flows
have become critical for developing countries. Academic research literature indicates that the
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benefits of FDI for developing countries reach beyond economic indicators and can also
influence improvements in social areas. A research study of 29 sub-Saharan countries from
1980-2003, Suliman and Mollick (2009) concluded that there is a positive relationship between
FDI inflows and the literacy rate. They also found that improvement in political rights and civil
liberties is associated with an increase in FDI inflows. However, it has also been proven that FDI
decisions are based on many exogenous factors other than taxes. Simões et al. (2015) determined
that when these exogenous variables are not convergent with fiscal policies, FDI flows can be
negatively affected. Borja (2017) concluded that corruption and political instability also affects
FDI inflows negatively. Suliman and Mollick (2009) determined that FDI flows are more likely
in countries promoting a stable and peaceful environment in which basic education and freedom
are encouraged. Naawaab and Diarrassouba (2016) on the other hand concluded that for lowincome countries the economic freedom alone is not enough to attract FDI flows. They
mentioned that other factors, like a highly skilled human capital need to also be present, to attract
FDI flows. The benefits of FDI seem to be evident for high, middle, and low-income countries.
Those benefits seem to have contributed to an intensification of the global competition to attract
and retain new foreign investments.
As previously discussed, in their quest to attract new investments, governments seek to
enact FDI-friendly policies. Governments are limited in what they can do to make traditional
FDI determinants like, market size and natural resources, more attractive. However, they can
change national policies to make their countries a more attractive destination for foreign
investments. Policies to promote economic freedom by eliminating or reducing trade barriers and
limit government intervention in their national economies, have been considered as an effective
way to attract FDI. Additionally, the enactment of policies intended to foster a favorable tax
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environment for foreign investors is another effective tool available to national legislators to
attract FDI flows. Making taxes less of a burden to potential investing firms seems to be a key
component to foster such a favorable tax environment. It is evident that corporate tax rates are an
important determinant on FDI decisions. According to Zodrow (2010), “There is a general
consensus that this empirical evidence demonstrates that FDI is in fact sensitive to tax factors
and suggests that this sensitivity may be increasing over time.” For investing firms looking to
expand their return on investments by expanding their market share while controlling costs, a
low tax burden becomes very attractive. In general terms, tax costs could add up to between 30%
to 40% of operating earnings. Therefore, a major goal for corporate executives would be to
minimize the impact of tax costs for their respective enterprises. The desire of investing firms to
expand operations within a low tax environment combined with the governments’ need to attract
FDI, has fueled an international tax competition that have increased in intensity in recent
decades. Competitive tax-cutting has become especially acute among industrialized Countries, as
they continue to compete to attract foreign investments while intent to simultaneously restrain
domestic investors from investing abroad, (Wijeweera et al., 2007). For governments, it appears
that the goal regarding FDIs need to be two-dimensional, 1) to attract new FDI and 2) retain
existing investments, whether domestic or foreign, from leaving the country. One of the
challenges being faced by governments in the current globalized economy seems to be that
globalization of the economy has facilitated capital mobility for MNCs. According to Wagner
and Eijffinger (2008), “When capital moves freely across borders, jurisdictions have an incentive
to compete with each other to attract capital investments. This can lead to a ‘race to the bottom’
and result in inefficiently low capital taxation.” This implies that national governments are
willing to enact lower corporate tax rates to attract FDI while, at the same time, discourage
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migration of capital. During the pre-crisis periods, the international competition for FDIs
triggered a trend of lower national corporate tax rates and increments in social expenditures,
Bretschger and Hettich (2002). It would be expected for this trend to continue for as long as
government spending doesn’t significantly exceed national tax revenues for extended periods of
time, as it can be argued that the current international tax competition is inducive to increases in
public debt, (Arcalean, 2017). The global financial crisis of 2008 had a significantly negative
effect on tax revenues worldwide and was a catalyst for significant deficits, mainly in developed
economies 9
FDI and the 2008 Financial Crisis
Ten years before the 2008 global financial crisis, the world economy was a witness to the
Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. During that time, the idea that financial crises would trigger a
‘Fire-Sale’ FDI was commonly accepted. Krugman (2000) mentioned that a potential reason that
idea became popular at the time could have been due to Mexico experiencing an increment of
inward FDIs during its 1995 financial crisis and Asia experiencing a wave of FDI inflows during
its 1997-98 crisis. A ‘Fire-Sale’ FDI triggered by a financial crisis would support the idea that
FDI flows would increase during the years after the 2008 global financial crisis. However,
Krugman (2000), also noticed the lack of statistical evidence supporting a surge of FDI into Asia
during its financial crisis of 1997-98 and concluded that more research on the topic would be
needed. Stoddard and Noy (2015) found significant negative relation between financial crises
and FDI inflows into a country. It needs to be noted that their sample was limited to developing
and emerging countries. Bhowmik (2017) observed that during the global financial crisis of
9

UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 2009
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/publications.aspx
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2008, FDI inflows decreased significantly for developed and developing economies alike.
Paulsen and Hufbauer (2011) discussed that during the 2008 global financial crisis, FDI flows
related to developed countries decreased more than the FDI flows related to developing
economies. Additionally, FDI flows data from the OECD and the UN, indicate a significant
decline in FDI flows during the immediate years after the 2008 global financial crisis. Ten years
after the 2008 financial crisis, global FDI flows have not reached the peak levels experienced in
2007. Keen et al. (2010) propose that a potential reason for the sharp decline in global FDI flows
after the crisis, could be due to high debt levels reported by most developed countries for the
years immediately before and after the crisis. In their study, Keen et al. (2010) also noted that
MNCs became highly leveraged during the years preceding the global financial crisis, mainly
due by tax distortions caused by highly complex national tax systems.
Additionally, policy makers could have been pressured to establish system reforms
intended to attract new FDI flows with the goal of increasing inward foreign investments while
retaining domestic capital. Kekic (2011), argued that the 2008 financial crisis seems to have
caused a shift in the pattern of global FDI flows and this could become a challenge for policy
makers relying on guidance based on reforms that have worked during previous global economic
downturns. Paulsen and Hufbauer (2011) advised policy makers to consider “sustainable FDI
strategies”. These would focus on the quality of the investments in addition to the quantity of
FDI flows. This advice suggests for policy makers to consider more comprehensive reforms.
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CHAPTER THREE:
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY
Background
The 2008 financial crisis led to a series of regulatory changes aimed at introducing
reforms to the world financial market. Some of the reform involved changes to the tax systems of
both FDI host countries and source countries, at large. The 2008 financial crisis created favorable
conditions for various reforms to revitalize global economics (Altman, 2009). Assessing the
determinants of FDI flows, Blonigen (2005) explains that taxes are among the endogenous
factors that influence both the establishment of a bilateral FDI relationship as well as FDI flows.
He finds that higher tax rates discourage FDI flows.
Notably, the tax complexity of both the source and host countries of FDI plays a
significant role in the flows of FDI. When the source country taxes the income generated by the
receiving country, while the receiving country also taxes the generated revenue, it leads to a
complex system that may increase taxes to exceed 100%, or creating a double taxation
circumstances leading to a higher tax rate, which will impact FDI flow negatively (Razin &
Sadka, 2007).
Several tax reforms have concentrated on the tax system to simplify the process and
mostly reduce tax rates. The main goal lowers tax costs to incentivize investment. Devereux
(2007) found that lower effective tax rates significantly influences the ‘where to invest’ decision
among multinationals. Holzmann and Büttner, (2018) informed the academic community that
due to encouragement and the growth of FDI flows, tax competition for FDI had led the
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substantial reduction of statutory tax rates in many countries, to encourage FDI and it has
become a global trend. This is aligned with the theoretical literature on the inverse relationship
between tax rates and FDI flows, which originates on the basis that lower tax costs will increase
returns for investors which in turn will be motivated to invest. There are many factors
influencing an investment location decision. The methodology employed in this study will
control for the main endogenous factors to determine the potential effects of tax complexity over
the decision to establish a bilateral FDI relationship and subsequent levels of FDI flows.
The impact of tax complexity on capital funding, especially FDI flows, is a general
problem that has been approached from different directions in many studies. However, a
thorough assessment of the various reforms on tax complexity and its potential effects over FDI
flows after the 2008 financial crisis were not examined from a bilateral relationship. The study
approaches the slow growth of FDI after the 2008 financial crisis from a bilateral perspective
(source and host countries) using empirical evidence to confirm the inverse relationship between
tax complexity and FDI flows, before and after the 2008 global financial crisis.
Study Purpose
The purpose of the study is to determine the impact of complexity levels of national tax
systems on bilateral FDI flows before and after the 2008 financial crisis. The study analyzes the
impact of tax complexity in the existence of bilateral FDI relationship and in subsequent levels
of FDI flows. An empirical model based on the gravity model of trade will be used to analyze
data from 2005 thru 2017. The results are compared to determine any variance in the relation
between tax complexity and bilateral FDI flows before and after the 2008 financial crisis.
The main goal of the study is to determine whether the inverse relation between tax
complexity and FDI proven to exist before the 2008 financial crisis, experienced any significant
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changes after the crisis or if the inverse relation continued without significant changes during the
years following the financial crisis. In order to accomplish this goal, the study intends to validate
the inverse relationship between tax complexity and bilateral FDI flows proven to exist during
the years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. Based on pre-crisis data, Lawless (2013)
determined that a negative relationship between tax complexity and bilateral FDI existed.
Moreover, she found no significant relation between tax complexity and subsequent levels of
FDI flows. Previous academic research also confirmed the negative relation between tax
complexity and FDI flows (Edminston et al., 2003; Muller & Voget, 2012). To date, no academic
research exists studies the effects of tax complexity over bilateral FDI flows following the 2008
financial crisis. As such, there is no empirical evidence on whether the negative relation between
tax complexity and bilateral FDI experienced any lasting effect after the Great Recession of
2008. The results of this study are important to the extent that they will document whether the
2008 financial crisis influenced the perception of tax complexity by international investors. It
will help policy makers to better understand the potential effects of fiscal policy changes on
bilateral FDI flows. Additionally, MNCs will benefit by better understanding the potential
impact of tax complexity on the return on investments.
Research Questions
The study aims to analyze the relationship between tax complexity and FDI flows
before and after the 2008 financial crisis. In analyzing this relationship, the study seeks to answer
a multi-step question. A main goal of the study is to determine whether the inverse relationship
between tax complexity and the existence of bilateral FDI relationships proven to exists the years
before the 2008 financial crisis experienced any significant changes. The other important goal of
the study is to determine whether any significant relation between tax complexity and bilateral
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FDI flows, developed during the years after the 2008 financial crisis. For that purpose, the study
developed the following research question (RQ): Has tax complexity become a more significant
factor for the existence and subsequent levels of FDI bilateral flows after the 2008 financial
crisis?
The study approached this question by gathering annual data of bilateral FDI flows
between 16 source countries and 57 host countries between 2005 and 2017. Data about tax
complexity levels, based on the World Bank’s Doing Business Index was also collected. An
empirical model based on the gravity trade model was employed to analyze the data. Results
were analyzed, compared, and further discussed in the Discussion Section of the study.
Hypothesis Development
Since the 1980s, many nations have been engaged in an international tax competition
to attract capital investments. This competition consists of lowering statutory income tax rates to
create the host country more profitable for international investors. The academic literature
supports the argument of a negative relation between statutory tax rates and FDI flows
(Wijeweera et al., 2007; Djankov et al., 2009; Djankov, 2010). The level of complexity of a
national tax system is an additional component of a fiscal system that affects foreign
investments. Based on data for the years preceding the 2008 financial crisis, Lawless, (2013)
demonstrated a negative relation between tax complexity and the existence of bilateral FDI
relationship. She also noted that tax complexity had no significant effect on the level of FDI
flows after a bilateral FDI relationship have been created.
H1: Tax Complexity and FDI Bilateral Relationships
The magnitude and extent in which the 2008 financial crisis negatively impacted the
global economy made the crisis unique and caused the first global economic contraction since
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the Second World War (UNCTAD-TDR 2009). The crisis led to a global recession of FDI flows.
In 2007 global FDI flows reached a peak of $2.1 trillion but had dropped to just over $1 Trillion
in 2009. Poulsen and Hufbauer (2013) explained that the sharp decline of FDI flows during the
crisis can be attributed in part to a more cautious investment attitude among MNCs mainly
driven by a lack of liquidity.
High complexity levels of national tax codes might have also contributed to the
recession of global FDI flows. Keen et al. (2010) explained that during the years preceding the
2008 financial crisis, high complexity levels of national tax codes encouraged MNCs to execute
aggressive tax planning strategies to minimize tax payments. They argued that low tax rates
encouraged MNCs to acquire high risk investments. Additionally, they noted that these practices
created tax distortions related to the future performance of MNC’s foreign investments. Based on
the above discussion, I propose the following hypothesis (H1): A negative relation between
national tax complexity and the existence of bilateral FDI flows continued after the 2008
financial crisis.
H2: Tax Complexity and FDI Flows
The regulatory environment for international investments after the 2008 financial
crisis is significantly different from the years preceding the crisis. Véron (2012) indicated that
policy makers from developed economies quickly moved towards increasing regulation. These
reforms were intended to attract FDI but also to protect national tax revenues. Slemrod (2016)
noted that in the United States and United Kingdom tax enforcement against tax avoidance and
tax evasion increased after the 2008 financial crisis. Dharmapala (2014) explained that in June of
2012, the G20 leaders announced their intention to work together with the OECD to prevent tax
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avoidance related to BEPS practice, and in July of 2013, the OECD issued an action plan for
multinational cooperation in international taxation.
Highly complex national tax codes could increase uncertainty and distortions related
profitability levels of foreign investments. Tax distortions and uncertainty negatively affect FDI
flows. Edminston et al. (2003) explained that tax complexity and uncertainty related to the tax
code had a negative relationship with FDI inflows. In 2009 global FDI flows added just over $1
Trillion, a 49% decrease from its peak reached in 2007. By 2015, global FDI flows showed a
sign of recovery reaching $1.7 Trillion. However, tax reforms intended to decrease incentives for
MNCs combined with uncertainty related to the 2017 tax reform in the United States contributed
to a downward trend in FDI flows that started in 2016 and continued through 2018, when global
FDI flows had receded to $1 Trillion levels 10. Based on the above discussion, I propose
following hypothesis (H2): An inverse relationship between tax complexity and levels of FDI
flows developed after the 2008 financial crisis.
Research Design
This study examines the association between tax complexity and bilateral FDI flows
before and after the 2008 global financial crisis.
Tax complexity is measured based on the World Bank’s Doing Business index, which
considers two units of data to measure tax complexity within a given country. These are: 1) the
annual number of hours needed by an average firm to comply with local country tax laws, and 2)
the annual number of payments necessary to comply with the national tax system. Levels of FDI
flows will be obtained from The International Direct Investment Report accessed via the
OECD’s databank. A simple regression analysis, following the approach employed by Lawless
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(2013), will be completed to determine whether the relation between tax complexity and levels
of FDI flows after the 2008 financial crisis.
This study applies the gravity model of trade to analyze factors determining bilateral FDI
flows between a pair of source and host countries. The gravity model is based on the physical
theory of gravity, which states that gravitational attraction between two objects is determined by
their respective mass volume and the distance between them. The object with a larger mass will
attract other objects with less mass volume. The attraction effect will diminish with distance. As
such, higher income levels of a country should attract larger trade flows. Distance between
countries will related negatively to trade flows between countries. The gravity model was first
used to explain trade flows by Tinbergen (1962). Since then, it has been used extensively in
academic literature to analyze trade between countries. Anderson (1979) refers to the gravity
equation as “the most successful empirical trade device of the last twenty-five years” and was the
first to derive the gravity equation from a model that assumed product differentiation. Although
the gravity model have been described as a “fact of life” when studying international trade
(Deardorff 1998), other scholars contributed to improve the model for purposes of analyzing
economic data (Bergstrand, 1985; Helpman, 1987; Matyaz, 1998; Breuss & Egger, 1999; Egger,
2000; Anderson, 2011). The gravity equation continues to be a favored tool in the study of
international trade and was used in academic literature to study the effects of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (Martinez-Zarzoso, 2003; Montenegro & Soloaga, 2006), and to estimate
the trade effects of the United Kingdom separation from the European Union (BREXIT) by
Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2018). The basic equation for the gravity model of trade is as
follows:
Fsh = C * Ms * Mh/Dsh
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Where Fsh represents trade flows from a source country into a host country, C is a constant value,
M stands for an economic factor (GDP, Population, etc.) being measured and D is the distance
between the source and host countries. In order for the gravity equation to work well in an
empirical analysis of trade, it will need to be enhanced to add a dummy variable used to identify
a shared characteristic between countries (shared border, language, etc...). The gravity equation
used for empirical analysis purposes is as follows:
Ms * Mh
Fsh = C

Xsh
Dsh

Where Fsh represents trade flows from a source country into a host country, C is a constant value,
M stands for an economic factor (GDP, Population, etc.) being measured, D is the distance
between the source and host countries and X the shared characteristic between both countries
that will be defined as a 1.
Using the gravity model to study FDI determinants necessitates identifying certain
economic factors within countries that will naturally attract more FDI flows. An example of this
would be the size of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country, where a country with
greater GDP will attract higher volumes of FDI flows. The gravity model also shows that
geographical distance between a source and a host country tends to decrease FDI activity. It has
been commonly used in academic literature to study bilateral FDI flows (Razin & Sadka. 2006;
Razin et al., 2008; Zwinkels & Beugelsdijk, 2010; Lawless, 2013). The study also applies the
two-step selection process called the Heckman model to control for bias in the selection of
establishing a bilateral FDI flow relationship. This model which was developed by James
Heckman allow for the correction of selection bias resulting from non-randomly selected
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samples, and employs a two-step approach, which the study uses when selecting the sample for
FDI bilateral relationship and subsequent FDI flows. This methodology was also employed by
Razin et al. (2004, 2005, 2008), Razin and Sadka (2006, 2007) and Lawless (2013).
The quantitative analysis regarding the relationship between tax complexity and the
levels of FDI flows will be based on completing regression analysis on the potential relationship
between the proxies of tax complexity and levels of FDI flows for the years from 2005 until
2017. The study will explore the potential effects of tax complexity on bilateral FDI flows after
the global financial crisis of 2008, by comparing correlation between these variables before and
after the 2008 crisis. The study incorporates data for FDI flows from a sample of 16 OECD
source countries and 57 host countries, which include OECD and non-OECD member countries.
Therefore, the study considers bilateral FDI flows between OECD countries, FDI flows from
OECD countries to non-OECD countries and FDI flows from non-OECD countries to OECD
countries. However, this study does not examine bilateral FDI flows between non-OECD
countries. Additionally, the sample of countries with data used in this study includes both
developed and developing countries.
The World Bank designed an index it calls ‘The Ease of Doing Business’ index. It ranks
the countries of the world based on the aggregate scores of 10 topics, each consisting of several
indicators adding to 41 indicators in the equation. One of the 10 topics is ‘Paying Taxes’, which
includes in its measuring methodology the number of tax payments per year and number of hours
per year, effectively including tax complexity in the index being explained in this paragraph.
This study utilizes these two measures 1) tax payments per year, and 2) number of hours per
year, as proxies for tax complexity. It is understood that countries that operate with high levels of
national tax complexity will report elevated numbers in these two indicators. By controlling for
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other variables, any effect that tax complexity could have on FDI flows could be measured for
each source-host country FDI bilateral relationship, for all countries included within the sample.
This study applies the Heckman selection model which requires a two-step approach. The
first step estimates the drivers of the selection into FDI in a probit model where the dependent
variable is an indicator that an FDI relationship exists between a host and source country pair,
and a range of country variables commonly used in the gravity specification for estimating trade
flows as independent variables. It is important to note that by utilizing this methodology, the
study considers instances of bi-directional trade flows, but only in those instances when
investments from the source country exceed investments coming into the source country from
investors residing in the host country. Razin et al. (2004, 2005, 2008) and Razin and Sadka
(2007) provide the blueprint for this two-stage approach of modelling initial selection into FDI
and then controlling for selection when modelling the bilateral FDI flows. They also show that
this two-stage model constitutes a significant improvement compared to specifications that fail to
recognize the need for making an adjustment for selection.
Specifically, inspired by Lawless (2013), this study models the FDI relationship between
a host country h and a source country s by an indicator, FDIdummysh, as follows:
1

if bZs + cZh + ush > 0

FDIdummysh =
0

otherwise

Where Zs and Zh are a set of economic variables from the source and host countries being
analyzed respectively, such as GDP per capita, statutory tax rates, and tax complexity proxies.
These variables will directly affect expected margins from a foreign investor. The equation
depicted above can be summarized as follows:
35

If, Net FDI Flows > 0, then FDIdummysh = 1
Otherwise, then FDIdummysh = 0
Where
Net FDI Flows = [FDI Outflows – FDI Inflows]
Once an FDI flow relationship has been created, the second stage models the
determinants of the FDI flow’s level while controlling for the endogenous selection into FDI by
including another independent variable, called the inverse Mills ratio, which was generated in the
first stage. The dependent variable in the second stage model (the FDI level equation) is the
observed FDI (FDI*) and it is estimated using the following model:
FDIsh = bXs + bXh + Vsh
Where
FDIsh = FDIsh * if FDIdummysh = 1 and FDIsh = 0 if FDIdummysh = 0
Where X would include economic variables of the countries being analyzed. Those variables
could be the same ones used in the Z values in the selection equation. Within the context of this
study, this last equation can also be expressed as follows:
If net FDI Flows > 0, then FDIsh = Net FDI Flows
Otherwise, FDIsh = 0
Note that in order to identify the Heckman model of equations above, an additional variable
(instrument) is required in the selection equation. Following Lawless (2013) we utilize the source
country indicator variable as an instrument.
For robustness purposes, this study also utilizes gross FDI Outflows (i.e. FDI flows from source
country into host country) in the second stage analysis of levels of FDI flows. In that instance the
FDI flows level equation can be expressed as follows:

36

If FDI Outflows > 0, then FDIsh = FDI Outflows
Otherwise, FDIsh = 0
Data Collection
This research is based on data related to FDI Outflows and FDI Inflows from 2005 thru
2017 in US dollars, as published by the OECD in its International Direct Investment Report. The
data used to measure tax complexity is extracted from the databank of the World Bank Doing
Business survey and it encompass from the years 2005 thru 2017.
The Doing Business survey is a project developed by the World Bank with the help of
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and based on the responses from accountants and tax lawyers
from 85 countries, (Lawless, 2013). According with information published by the World Bank,
the Doing Business surveys records the taxes and mandatory contributions that a medium-size
company must pay in a given year. Taxes and mandatory contributions include corporate income
tax, social contributions and labor taxes paid by the employer, property taxes, property transfer
taxes, dividend tax, capital gains tax, ﬁnancial transactions tax, waste collection taxes, vehicle
and road taxes, and any other small taxes or fees. The data used as proxies to measure tax
complexity, as published by the World Bank Doing Business Survey is tax payments and tax
hours.
The tax payment indicator, as published by the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey
reflects the total number of taxes and contributions paid, the method of payment, the frequency
of payment, the frequency of ﬁling and the number of agencies involved. This indicator also
takes into account electronic ﬁling. The tax is counted as paid once a year even if ﬁlings and
payments are more frequent. It could be argued that this last characteristic could distort the real
dimension and level of complexity as related to the number of tax payments, but it is still well-
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established and widely accepted proxy of tax complexity within the business and academic
communities.
The time (measured in hours) required to comply with local tax law as published by the
World Bank’s Doing Business survey measures the time taken to prepare, ﬁle and pay three
major types of taxes and contributions: the corporate income tax, value added or sales tax, and
labor taxes, including payroll taxes and social contributions. The World Bank published the
following regarding this indicator, “Filing time includes the time to complete all necessary tax
return forms and ﬁle the relevant returns at the tax authority. Payment time considers the hours
needed to make the payment online or in person. Where taxes and contributions are paid in
person, the time includes delays while waiting.” These two indicators are well accepted proxies
for tax complexity within the business and academic communities. However, these indicators do
not provide much information about the national regulatory environment or the level of
aggressiveness of local tax authorities. These two factors could signify a different dimension of
complexity to achieve tax compliance. At the very least, it has the potential to increase tax
compliance costs.
Data for additional variables was also collected from the World Bank databank to
complete this study including GDP in US dollars, country population, level of education and
corruption control. Corporate tax rates were collected from the KPMG publication. Official
languages for each Country included in the sample of countries were gathered from reports
published by the CIA. Information about member countries of the OECD and the dates when
they became members were collected from the OECD official website. Information about
whether each country was classified as a High-Income country was obtained from the World
Bank’s database. The next section of this chapter provides more information about each variable.
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Variables Description
The empirical methodology used in the study is based on the gravity model and
involves twelve variables. Table 1 in the Appendices provides a brief description for all
variables. A more detailed description follows:
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI): Bilateral FDI flows between sampled countries. The
data was collected from annual OECD International Direct Investment Reports in USD for the
years between 2005 and 2017. The information is available in gross FDI Outflows and net FDI
Flows. This is the dependent variable.
Time to Comply: Annual hours necessary to be invested in order to prepare, file, and pay
all tax returns, whether online or in person, necessary to comply with local tax laws of the Host
Country. The type of tax returns considered for this variable are: corporate income tax, value
added or sales tax, and payroll taxes including social contributions. The data was collected from
the World Bank’s Doing Business annual survey for the years 2005 through 2017.
Relative Time to Comply: The time to comply ratio between Host and Source Countries.
It is calculated by dividing Host Country’s time to comply over the Source Country’s time to
comply.
Number of Payments: Total number of taxes and contributions necessary to be paid
within a year, in order to comply with local tax laws of the Host Country. This variable considers
the method of payment, the frequency of payment, the frequency of ﬁling and the number of
agencies involved. This variable takes into account electronic ﬁling. The data was collected from
the World Bank’s Doing Business annual survey for the years 2005 through 2017.
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Relative Number of Payments: The number of payments ratio between Host and Source
Countries. It is calculated by dividing Host Country’s number of payments to comply over
Source Country’s number of payments.
Statutory Tax Rate: Corporate income tax rate applicable in the Host country. Data was
collected for the years 2005 through 2017 from KPMG’ Global Corporate Tax Rates Table.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): The sum of gross value added by all resident producers
in the economy plus any product taxes, minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
products. Data was available in current USDs from the World Banks’ database. For the empirical
analysis, the study used GDP data from the Host and Source countries.
Population: Total residents of the country regardless of legal status or citizenship as
published by World Banks’ database. For the empirical analysis, the study used Population data
from the Host and Source countries.
Language: A dummy variable which reflected a value of ‘1’ if the Host and Source
countries had the same official language. Data about each country official languages was
obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States.
Schooling Difference: The difference of the level of education between the Source and
Host countries. The level of education for each country is measured by the average years of
education completed among people over the age of 15. The data is available from the World
Bank’s database.
Host in OECD: A dummy variable which reflected a value of ‘1’ if the Host country was
a member of the OECD for the year under analysis. Data about each member country of the
OECD, including the year they became members, was obtained from the OECD’s official
website (www.oecd.org).
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Non-High-Income Country: A dummy variable which reflected a value of ‘1’ if the Host
country was not considered a High-Income Country for the year under analysis. Data about each
country’s classification as a High-Income Country was obtained from the World Bank’s
database.
Sample of Countries
Following the approach employed by Lawless (2013), this research examines the
determinants of bilateral FDI flows between 16 OECD member countries identified as FDI
source countries and 57 host countries, which include OECD and non-OECD member countries.
The sample of source countries include twelve European nations, Japan, Korea, Australia, and
the United States. All source countries are considered as developed economies and included in
the host countries sample which consists of developed and developing economies. However, no
low-income economies were included in the sample of host countries. Table 2 provides the list of
the all 16 Source countries and 57 Host countries.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
Empirical Findings
All tables referenced in the findings section are location in the Appendices. Table 3
shows the basic correlation coefficients among the most relevant independent variables and their
respective correlation with the dependent variable (i.e. FDI Flows). Reviewing the correlations
between independent variables, the tax complexity measures show positive correlations, and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Number of payments and relative number of payments
had positive correlations with statutory tax rate. Although statistically significant at the 1% level,
they are considerably small at -0.07 and -0.05 respectively. Time to comply and relative time to
comply show to have a positive correlation with statutory tax rate. Although they are statistically
significant to the 1% level, they are considerably small at 0.06 and 0.07, respectively. The basic
correlations derived from this basic test, show that larger host countries (as measured by
population) have more complex national tax systems, as all their correlations show to be positive
and statistically significant. That was not the case for larger source countries, which show a
negative correlation with tax complexity measures, although significantly smaller and, excluding
the ratios (relative time to comply and relative number of payments), they were not statistically
significant. Countries with a higher level of education show to have more complex tax systems.
Another interesting result from this simple test is that larger host countries (as measured by GDP
and Population) show to have higher statutory tax rates.
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Looking at the correlations between FDI flows and the independent variables, it shows as
being negatively associated with statutory tax rate, GDP per capita for host and source countries,
and with the population of the source country. All negative relations show to be statistically
significant at the 1% level. The negative correlation between FDI flows and Statutory Tax Rate
was expected, although it is particularly small at 0.03. The negative correlations between FDI
flows with population and GDP per capita are more interesting, because both independent
variables are traditionally considered as FDI determinants. Although causation cannot be derived
from these correlations, a possible explanation could be the sharp decrease of FDI flows related
to developed economies during the years following the 2008 financial crisis.
Tables 4 and 5 report the regression analysis using data from the three years preceding
the crisis (2005-2007). The tests in these tables are based on net FDI flows to determine
existence of bilateral FDI flows in the first stage (selection model) and on levels of FDI in the
second stage model. Results in this pre-crisis period are generally mixed in terms of providing
support for the notion that tax complexity matters for FDI flows. On one hand, Table 4 results
indicate that time to comply has a positive, albeit weak, relationship with the existence of an FDI
relationship and an insignificant effect on the level of FDI. The relationship to FDI flows
becomes significant when we use the relative time to comply proxy for tax complexity. On the
other hand, results in Table 5 indicate a strong negative effect of both the number of payments
and the relative number of payments proxies of tax complexity on the existence of bilateral FDI
flows and an insignificant effect on FDI flows. This pattern of results is in line with the evidence
in Lawless (2013) and suggests that during the years before the 2008 financial crisis, investors
considered the costs related to coping with tax complexity as fixed costs associated with
establishing a new investment in a foreign market. Result from both tables also show statutory
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tax rates to have a negative and statistically significant relationship related to the existence of
FDI bilateral relationship and stronger significant negative relationship on the subsequent level
of FDI flows. These results are similar and consistent with prior academic research (Djankov et
al. 2008). This could indicate that during the years before the 2008 financial crisis, investors
considered corporate statutory rates as a significant deterrent to establishing a new investment in
a foreign market, as well as a very important factor that drives decisions to increase or decrease
their investment positions in foreign markets. Results from tables 4 and 5 also show GDP per
capita, from the host and source countries, as having positive relationship with the level of FDI
flows. This aligns with the gravity model of trade and with previous academic research,
(Corcoran & Gillanders, 2015), (Djankov et al., 2008) and (Chowdhury & Mavrotas, 2006).
However, results show no significant relationship between GDP and the existence of bilateral
FDI relationship during the years preceding the global financial crisis.
Tables 6 and 7 report the regression analysis using data for the nine years after the 2008
financial crisis from 2009 to 2017. The regression analysis shown in these tables is also based on
net FDI flows related to the existence of bilateral FDI flows and subsequent levels of FDI and
therefore can be directly compared to those from the pre-crisis period shown in Tables 4 and 5.
Overall, the results in Tables 6 and 7 show some similarities but also some important differences
when compared to the results depicted in Tables 4 and 5. In the Post-crisis period, both the time
to comply and number of payments, proxies of tax complexity, are having a strong inverse
relation with the level of Net FDI flows. In addition, as in the pre-crisis period, the number of
payments proxy is also an important determinant of the selection into an FDI relationship. These
results suggest that the inverse correlation between national tax complexity and the existence of
bilateral FDI flows continued during the years after the 2008 global financial crisis. Moreover,
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these results suggest that a negative correlation between tax complexity and the level of FDI
flows developed during the years following the global financial crisis. A possible explanation for
these patterns of results is that in the post-crisis period foreign governments intensified pressure
via tax regulation on foreign multinationals, or alternatively, that foreign MNCs have become
more sensitive to local tax complexity when deciding on the level of their foreign direct
investments.
Another interesting finding shown in tables 6 and 7 relates to statutory corporate tax
rates. Although results still show statutory tax rates as having a negative relationship related to
the existence of an FDI bilateral relationship, the relationship doesn’t show to be significant and
it is considerably weaker, as it did in the analysis of the data from the years before the financial
crisis. This could be interpreted as MNCs became less responsive to statutory tax rates during the
years after the financial crisis when deciding over new investments. This could also suggest a
shift from historic trends, but more research is needed to determine whether this result represents
a more permanent trend after the financial crisis. GDP per capita from the host and source
countries show a statistically significant positive relationship with the level of FDI flows.
Although this is consistent with the analysis of the data from the years prior of the global
financial crisis, the positive coefficients of GDP per capita from source country in the second
stage regression seem to be smaller in absolute terms during the years following the financial
crisis than during the years prior to the crisis. Since all source countries within the sample are
developed economies, this could be explained by the diminished, albeit still significant, role of
developed economies as global sources of FDI flows following the 2008 financial crisis.
Tables 8 and 9 report the Heckman regression results for the subsample covering the
years 2005 to 2007. The analysis is based on the same definition of the selection model
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dependent variable (i.e. use positive values of Net FDI flows to define the existence of a bilateral
FDI relationship) but this time the total rather than the net FDI outflows from source to host
country are used as a dependent variable in the second stage regression.
Results in Tables 8 and 9 are largely in line with those shown with their counterparts in
Tables 4 and 5 with respect to the time to comply and number of payment proxies of tax
complexity. Time to comply does not have much explanatory power across the different models
with the exception of column (1), whereas the number of tax payments have a significant
negative impact on the decision to establish an FDI relationship but do not affect the level of FDI
flows. Additionally, these results aligned with evidence from existing academic literature for the
pre-crisis period (Lawless, 2013). Moreover, the results from Tables 8 and 9 with respect to the
relative tax complexity measures seem to correspond to those in Tables 4 and 5.
Tables 10 and 11 report the Heckman regression results for the subsample covering the
years 2009 thru 2017, (i.e. the period after the 2008 financial crisis). Results in Table 10 show
that time to comply has negative but insignificant coefficients in all but one (FDI level)
regressions, whereas the relative time to comply coefficients are negative and significant in the
selection model regressions. Thus, overall, it appears that time to comply may affect the
selection into FDI but not the level of FDI post-crisis. Table 11 shows that both the number of
payments as well as the relative number of payments have significant negative coefficients in all
selection models, but only the number of payments has significant (negative) coefficients in the
second stage (FDI level) models.
Furthermore, the regression analysis shows statutory corporate tax rates continue having
a significantly strong negative effect on the level of FDI flows but generally no impact on the
decision to establish an FDI relationship.

46

Overall, the regression analysis shows high complexity levels of national tax systems as
having a negative effect in the establishment of bilateral FDI relationships. The study confirms
that this negative relation existed during the years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. This
inverse relation showed to be persistent the years subsequent to the crisis. However, the analysis
done in the study does not provide enough evidence to conclude that this negative relation
intensified after the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, the results from the regression analysis
support H1, which stated that a negative relation between national tax complexity and the
existence of bilateral FDI flows continued after the 2008 financial crisis. The regression analysis
from this study also show high complexity levels of national tax systems as having a negative
relation with levels of FDI flows after the 2008 financial crisis. Results from regression analysis
confirms that tax complexity had no significant effect on the level of FDI during the years
preceding the 2008 financial crisis. Conversely, the regression analysis shows a strong inverse
relation from both tax proxies with levels of FDI flows. Therefore, results from the regression
analysis supports H2, which stated that an inverse relationship between tax complexity and levels
of FDI flows developed after the 2008 financial crisis.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Discussion
This study provides new evidence about the relationship between tax complexity and
bilateral FDI flows before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. Empirical evidence from
this study will help policy makers, regulators, investors, and executives from MNCs to better
understand the international investment environment after the 2008 global financial crisis.
Previous academic research based on data from pre-crisis period, found tax complexity as having
a significantly negative relation with the existence of bilateral FDI relationships but no
significant effect on subsequent levels of FDI flows (Lawless 2013).
This study finds that tax complexity significantly and negatively affects FDI flows
after a bilateral FDI relationship has been established. Empirical evidence from this study
suggests that this negative relation developed during the years following the 2008 financial
crisis. Additionally, results from this study show tax complexity to have a significantly negative
relation with the existence of FDI relationship. This negative relation was observed in the
regression analysis performed with data before and after the 2008 financial crisis. These results
also contribute to existing literature by providing empirical evidence of how the relation between
tax complexity and bilateral FDI has evolved during the years before and after the 2008 financial
crisis.
These results add to the tax complexity and FDI literatures. Additionally, it will help to
better understand the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis over the international investment
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environment. There is abundant research dedicated to the study of tax complexity, but there is
still relatively limited academic research that analyzes the effects of tax complexity over FDI.
This study contributes by adding knowledge about how the effects of tax complexity over
bilateral FDI has evolved over time, perhaps as a direct consequence of a global Macroeconomic
event like the 2008 financial crisis. But more research will need to be done before arriving to that
conclusion. This study also provides evidence of how the effect of tax complexity over bilateral
FDI has developed after the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, it provides insights about
potential changes, at least in some countries, in the relation between FDI and few traditional FDI
determinants, like GDP and statutory tax rates after the 2008 financial crisis. More research will
need to be done to confirm whether the observations from the regression analysis in this study
will become a more permanent trend.
Policy makers and regulators will benefit from this study by obtaining evidence about
FDI flows becoming more sensitive to local tax complexity during the years after the 2008
financial crisis. Based on the findings of this study, policy makers and regulators should take into
consideration the impact to FDI inflows when enacting new regulations and enforcement.
Additionally, this study will help legislators to evaluate the exposure to potential future financial
crises in an era of increased regulations, highly leveraged governments and reduced global FDI
flows. Similarly, investors and MNC executives will gain from the results of this study by
helping them to better understand how the international investment environment have changed
after the 2008 financial crisis and how they can be better prepared for the next crisis. Evidence
from this study will also help MNC executives to evaluate potential effects of tax complexity
over the return on their foreign investments and the impact on MNCs bottom line.
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Conclusion
The effects of tax complexity over bilateral FDI is a complex topic and further
research is needed. The importance of FDI for the global economy is well documented and the
effects of tax rates over FDI are well known. Previous academic literature has studied the effects
of tax complexity over bilateral FDI during pre-crisis period. This study adds to existing
literature by contributing new evidence about the relationship between tax complexity and
bilateral FDI and how it changed after the 2008 financial crisis.
This study analyzed the effects of tax complexity over bilateral FDI flows before and
after the 2008 financial crisis. It applied a two-stage methodology to analyze the tax complexity
effects over the existence of bilateral FDI between a pair of countries and its effect over
subsequent levels of FDI flows. The study finds that tax complexity has a significant negative
effect on both the existence of bilateral FDI relationship and the subsequent level of FDI flows.
Evidence from this study suggest that a significant negative effect over FDI flows developed
after the 2008 financial crisis.
The results obtained from of this study have important implications for national policy
makers. Based on the results from this study, combined with findings from earlier academic
literature, policy makers should establish the goal of reducing fiscal regulatory complexities
while keeping statutory income tax rates at reasonably competitive levels. This, understanding
that during the years after the 2008 financial crisis, national tax complexity is taking a potentially
increasing role in determining levels of FDI flows, combined with the proven fact that statutory
tax rates still plays an important role in attracting new FDI and determining levels of FDI flows.
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Limitations
This study had some limitations that should be considered when interpreting and applying
its results. Due to data availability constraints, bilateral FDI flows data is limited to FDI flows
between 16 OECD member countries (i.e. source countries) and 57 host countries. The 57 host
countries included other OECD member countries as well as non-OECD member countries. All
16 source countries are Developed Economies. There were no Low-Income countries included in
the sample of countries. Additionally, tax complexity is measured based on standards developed
by the World Bank’s Doing Business Index. While these standards are widely accepted, still
effective proxies for tax complexities and used consistently within academic literature, advances
in technology could limit their ability to measure real tax complexity levels.
Future Research
Future research related to this topic can be completed to examine the relationship
between tax complexity and the aggressiveness of a country’s regulatory environment and how
these could affect bilateral FDI, MNC’s financial reporting, their stock price and cross-border
investments. Additional area of future research could be analyzing whether uncertain tax
provisions reported by MNCs have experienced any significant changes before and after the
2008 financial crisis.
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Table A1. The 12 variables employed in the empirical analysis
Variable
Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI)

Source
International Direct Investment
from OECD

Time to Comply

World Bank Doing Business
Survey

Relative Time to Comply

Manually Calculated with Data
from World Bank Doing Business
Survey

Number of Payments

World Bank Doing Business
Survey

Relative Number of
Payments

Manually Calculated with Data
from World Bank Doing Business
Survey

Statutory Tax Rate

KPMG’s Global Corporate Tax
Rates Tables
World Bank Database

Gross Domestic Product
(GDP)
Population
Language
Schooling Difference

Host in OECD

World Bank Database

Definition
Bilateral FDI flows in USD.
Report provides FDI outflows
and
FDI inflows.
Total annual time (measured
in hours) to prepare and pay
taxes to comply with local tax
law.
Time to comply ratio.
Host country’s time to comply
divided over Source country’s
time to comply.
Total number of annual
payments required to comply
with local tax rules.
Number of payments’ ratio.
Host number of payments
divided over source country’s
number of payments.
Statutory corporate income tax
rate
Gross Domestic Product in
USD
Total residents of the country.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Report
World Bank Database

Official language(s) of the
country.
Difference between host and
source countries of the
average years of education
completed among population
over age 15.

OECD Website
www.oecd.org

Indicates whether host country
is a member of the OECD.
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Table A2. List of 16 OECD member countries identified as FDI source countries and 57 host
countries (includes OECD and non-OECD member countries)
Source Countries
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Korea
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
USA

Host Countries
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Czech Rep
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Greece

Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Kuwait
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Panama
Philippines

Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
UAE
UK
Ukraine
USA
Venezuela
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Table A3. Basic correlation coefficients among the most relevant independent variables and their respective correlation with the
dependent variable (i.e. FDI Flows).
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Table A4. Regression Analysis: Data from pre-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the
first stage (selection model) and on levels of FDI in the second stage model (tax complexity proxy is Time to Comply with Taxes)
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Table A5. Regression analysis: Data from pre-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the
first stage (selection model) and on levels of FDI in the second stage model (tax complexity proxy is Number of Payments)
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Table A6. Regression analysis: data from post-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the
first stage (selection model) and on levels of FDI in the second stage model (tax complexity is Time to Comply)
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Table A7. Regression analysis: data from post-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the
Regression analysis of data from post-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the first stage
(selection model) and on levels of FDI in the second stage mode (tax complexity proxy is Number of Payments)
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Table A8. Regression analysis: data from pre-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the
first stage (selection model) and gross FDI Outflows in the second stage model (tax complexity proxy is Time to Comply)
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Table A9. Regression analysis: data from pre-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the
first stage (selection model) and gross FDI Outflows in the second stage model (tax complexity proxy is Number of Payments)
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Table A10. Regression analysis: data from post-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the
first stage (selection model) and gross FDI Outflows in the second stage model (tax complexity proxy is Time to Comply)
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Table A11. Regression analysis: data from post-crisis period based on net FDI flows to determine existence of bilateral FDI flows in the
first stage (selection model) and gross FDI Outflows in the second stage model (tax complexity proxy is Number of Payments)
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Data Source: https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx

Figure A1. Annual global FDI flows based on the UN World Investment Report (from
nine years before the 2008 financial crisis and nine years after the crisis)
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Figure A2. Number of tax payments: World Averages (as published by the World Bank
Doing Business, from 2005 to 2017)
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Figure A3. Time to Prepare and Pay Taxes: World Averages (as published by the World
Bank Doing Business, from 2005 to 2017)
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